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Virtual Blinds: Finding Online
Privacy in Offline Precedents
Allyson W. Haynes*
ABSTRACT
A person in a building shows a desire for privacy by pulling her
blinds shut or closing her curtains. Otherwise, she cannot complain
when her neighbor sees her undressing from the window, or when a
policeman looks up from the street and sees her marijuana plants. In
the online context, can we find an analogy to these privacy blinds? Or
is the window legally bare because of the nature of the Internet?
This Article argues that by analyzing the privacy given to
communications in the offline context, and in particular, by analyzing
case law recognizing privacy in an otherwise public place when the
individual engages in affirmative efforts to ensure her privacy, the law
can find a sensible foundation for recognizing privacy online. This
Article proposes a framework that incorporates the following factors in
the reasonable expectations of privacy context. First is the existence of a
user agreement or employer policy governing the use of the specific
communication mechanism or providing for monitoring of that use.
Second is the extent to which third parties have access to or protect the
communications. Third is the notice given to the user of the user
agreement, employer policy, or practice of giving access to or protection
from third parties. Finally, the fourth factor is the availability and use
of privacy-enhancing controls which increase the likelihood of the
communication being protected from disclosure to people other than the
chosen recipient(s), including but not limited to (a) passwords, (b)
encryption technology, (c) network configuration, and (d) privacy
settings limiting disclosure to certain people.
Courts can adapt this test to a civil tort or Fourth Amendment
context, to employment and non-employment cases, and to statutory
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privacy claims. It is a logical evolution from the practical factors that
courts have looked at in offline cases-like closing doors and securing
lockers-and it is consistent with the growing weight of authority that
finds a reasonable expectation of privacy in online communications
where the Internet user avails herself of privacy-ensuring measures.
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ONLINE PRIVACY IN OFFLINE PRECEDENTS
Communication and socializing in general in our society now
take place largely on the Internet. We send and receive email, post
information to websites, share files, and use online social networks on
a daily basis. These methods have replaced more traditional media.
But privacy law has not kept pace with this technological trend. In
Fourth Amendment, privacy torts, and federal statutory contexts,
courts have struggled with the application of privacy concepts to
online disclosures. This Article argues that, by analyzing the privacy
given to communications in the offline context, particularly by
analyzing case law recognizing privacy when the individual engages
affirmative efforts to ensure her privacy, or denying such a right
where the individual fails to do so, the law can find a sensible
foundation for recognizing privacy online.
This Article proposes a framework that incorporates the
following factors in the reasonable expectations of privacy context: (1)
the existence of a user agreement or employer policy governing the use
of the specific communication method or providing for monitoring of
that use, (2) the extent to which third parties receive access to or
protect the communications (whether part of a policy or not), (3) the
notice given to the user of the user agreement, employer policy, or
practice of giving access to or protection from third parties, and (4) the
availability and use of privacy-enhancing controls (including but not
limited to passwords, encryption technology, network configuration,
and privacy settings limiting disclosure to certain people).
Part I discusses the tangled web of privacy law, as well as some
of the rich scholarship describing privacy's importance to society.
Because so much communication takes place via the Internet, some
sense of online privacy is vital. While it is obvious that a person has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a comment,
photograph, or video posted on the World Wide Web, there are
contexts in which Internet communications should receive privacy
protection. These contexts include communications via email and
postings on limited-access websites and online social networks.
Part II looks at privacy offline, where the law has traditionally
focused on the distinction between public and private communications.
The precedent supports finding a limited reasonable expectation of
privacy in both common law and Fourth Amendment contexts where
disclosure occurs in a public place, but the individual makes
affirmative efforts to ensure privacy. This is critical for the transition
to the Internet, where the distinction between public and private is
problematic for technical reasons, including the necessity of
third-party disclosure.
Part III applies this precedent to the online context. Here,
many courts have given too little privacy protection to
2012] 605
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communications, finding waivers of protection based on entrenched
notions of privacy as tantamount to secrecy. Instead, courts should
give effect to individual efforts to ensure their privacy despite the
Internet medium, as in the offline context. Many courts have applied
this reasoning to cases involving email. While some cases have found
otherwise, this Article argues that there should be a privacy interest
in email even after it has arrived at its recipient's inbox. In addition,
courts should extend privacy protection to other disclosures online,
including some information disclosed on social networks, depending on
the extent to which the user employs affirmative privacy-enhancing
controls.
Part IV proposes a framework for analyzing reasonable
expectations of privacy on the Internet. This framework balances
factors including the existence of user agreements or employer policies
providing for privacy of the communications, the notice of those
policies given to the user, the availability of privacy-enhancing
controls, and the user's affirmative engagement of such controls.
Courts can adapt this test to a civil tort or Fourth Amendment
context, to employment and non-employment cases, and to statutory
privacy claims. It is a logical evolution from the factors that courts
have looked at in offline cases, and it is consistent with the growing
weight of authority that finds a reasonable expectation of privacy in
online communications where the Internet user avails herself of
privacy-ensuring measures-the digital equivalent of curtains, doors,
and locks.
Part V looks ahead at the changes taking place within online
social networks (OSNs) in terms of privacy settings and other user
controls. Application of the proposed balancing framework to
communications within online social networks will allow the law to
keep pace with the evolution of the use of the Internet for
communications and socializing purposes. It will also recognize that
user-activated controls are an important element of the analysis of a
reasonable expectation of privacy in online disclosures.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF A RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN ONLINE DISCLOSURES
Underlying this Article's search for a coherent analysis of
online privacy interests is the belief that some level of privacy in
Internet communications is essential to contemporary society. The US
Supreme Court noted in the recent case of City of Ontario v. Quon
that, because new technology renders more pervasive certain methods
of communication, it also increases the need for recognition of privacy
[Vol. 14:3:603606
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rights in those communications.' While the Court assumed without
deciding that the plaintiff government employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in text messages sent and received on a
government-provided pager, the Court acknowledged that changes in
technology and in society's use of that technology would affect
"workplace norms, and the law's treatment of them"2:
Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may
consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even
self-identification. That might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. On the
other hand, the ubiquity of those devices has made them generally affordable, so one
could counter that employees who need cell phones or similar devices for personal
matters can purchase and pay for their own. And employer policies concerning
communications will of course shape the reasonable expectations of their employees,
especially to the extent that such policies are clearly communicated.
3
The "pervasive" nature of Internet use is similarly pushing boundaries
and societal norms in terms of privacy expectations. As online
communications become ubiquitous, the law should revisit
expectations of privacy.
Privacy is difficult to define, 4 but essential to society.5
Professor Daniel J. Solove of George Washington University Law
School refers to privacy as a "mosaic," as it underlies "tort law,
constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, evidentiary
privileges, property law, and contract law."6 This Article focuses on
the privacy of communications, 7 and how common-law tort theories,
statutory provisions, and the Fourth Amendment protect them.8 This
analysis also includes some recent case law in the context of discovery
of online communications, a new hotbed for privacy issues.9
1. City of Ont. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629-30 (2010).
2. Id. at 2623.
3. Id. at 2630.
4. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 424-25 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1090-91
(2002) (noting the difficulties in conceptualizing privacy using common requisite denominators
and instead advocating a concept based on "family resemblances").
6. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1430 (2001).
7. While remedying online invasions of privacy is very important, that is not the focus
of this Article. Instead, it focuses on the necessity of individuals to be confident in the privacy of
some communications, without the law deeming those communications necessarily public
because they were made online.
8. While there are obvious differences between common-law tort principles, Fourth
Amendment protections, and statutory provisions, the analysis of privacy overlaps. See Sanders
v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 74 n.3 (Cal. 1999) (citing Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369
(1968)) (recognizing distinctions between employees' expectations of privacy in tort and Fourth
Amendment contexts, but noting that the Supreme Court has analogized the situations as well).
9. See Ryan A. Ward, Note, Discovery Facebook: Social Network Subpoenas and the
Stored Communications Act, 24 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 563 (2011).
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As eminent scholars have established, privacy of
communication is essential to free speech and self-expression,' 0 to
encouragement of diversity," to facilitation of relationships,12 and to
the formation of personhood or personality.13
Many of the activities that privacy enables now take place via
the Internet. Rather than regular mail, we use email. In fact, 92
percent of adult Internet users use email,14 which translates to more
than 225 million people,15 or 71 percent of the entire US population.16
Rather than telephone conversations or get-togethers, we have online
chatting and Facebook. A recent survey shows that 65 percent of
online adults, or half of all adults in the United States, use social
networking sites.17 That is more than double the percentage who
10. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 990-92 (2003); see Josh Blackman, Omniveillance, Google,
Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your Digital Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating
an Individual's Image over the Internet, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313, 325-27 (2009) (arguing that
privacy protections promote free speech and expression).
11. Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense
of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2398 (1996) ("[S]trengthening privacy protections would seem to
foster diversity, by reducing the private cost of 'abnormal' behavior."); see id. at 2416 ("There are
also dynamic benefits to a legal regime that protects privacy, including the willingness of people
to engage in activities that they would not in the absence of anonymity, the reduction of
expensive extralegal precautions, and the reduction of wasteful expenditures on
reputation-enhancement needed to correct misapprehensions caused by disclosure of true but
incomplete information.").
12. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8
(2000) ("Privacy protects us from being misdefined and judged out of context in a world of short
attention spans, a world in which information can easily be confused with knowledge. True
knowledge of another person is the culmination of a slow process of mutual revelation.").
13. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 963 (1989) (suggesting privacy torts safeguard general
"civility rules" and uphold "social personality" as opposed merely to individual injuries); id. at
1010 ("[W]e are thus led to attempt to rationalize the value of privacy, to discover its functions
and reasons, to dress it up in the philosophical language of autonomy, or to dress it down in the
economic language of information costs. But this is to miss the plain fact that privacy is for us a
living reality only because we enjoy a certain kind of communal existence. Our very 'dignity'
inheres in that existence, which, if it is not acknowledged and preserved, will vanish, as will the
privacy we cherish." (footnote omitted)).
14. KRISTEN PURCELL, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SEARCH AND EMAIL STILL TOP THE LIST OF
MOST POPULAR ONLINE ACTIVITIES 2 (2011), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/-/
media//Files/Reports/2011/PIPSearch-and-Email.pdf.
15. See Internet Users, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2153.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (noting that the
United States had 245 million Internet users in 2009).
16. According to the latest US Government Census figures, there are over 313 million
people in the United States. U.S. World & Population Clocks, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
17. 65% of Online Adults Use Social Networking Sites, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 26,
2011), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2088/social-networking-sites-myspace-facebook-lnkedin.
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reported social networking site usage in 2008.18 Being online is a
daily necessity for most Americans, both socially and economically,
and the Internet's prevalence will continue to grow. 19
The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently
recognized that, "like the telephone earlier in our history, email is an
ever-increasing mode of private communication, and protecting shared
communications through this medium is as important to Fourth
Amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations
has been in the past."2 0 Also, the rapid rise of online social networking
(among older adults as well as young people) 21 as a means to keep up
with both close ties and more distant ones, 22 suggests that OSNs, too,
are an ever-increasing mode of shared communications. 23
Thus, it is essential that the law allow some kind of private
space for online communications, depending on the context. As in
other areas of the law, the move to the online context is better
understood by a close examination of the offline context.24 Part II
18. Id.
19. Janna Quitney Anderson & Lee Rainie, Millennials' Likely Lifelong Online Sharing
Habit, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 9, 2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1660/internet-experts-
say-aging-millennials-will-continue-per ("In a survey about the future impact of the internet, a
solid majority of technology experts and stakeholders said the Millennial generation will lead
society into a new world of personal disclosure and information-sharing using new media. These
experts said the communications patterns 'digital natives' have already embraced through their
use of social networking technology and other social technology tools will carry forward even as
Millennials age, form families and move up the economic ladder.").
20. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc), vacated, 532
F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
21. Lee Rainie et al., Social Networking Sites and Our Lives, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June
16, 2011), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2025/social-impact-social-networking-sites-technology-
facebook ("[Tihe average age of adult-SNS [social networking service] users has shifted from 33
in 2008 to 38 in 2010."). More than "half of all adult SNS users are now over the age of 35." Id.
22. Id. ("Social networking sites are increasingly used to keep up with close social
ties.").
23. See Patricia Sanchez Abril, Perspective, A (My)Space of One's Own: On Privacy and
Online Social Networks, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 74 (2007). Professor Abril argues
that the protection of privacy on online social networks is necessary for four reasons. Id. at 83.
First, "social networking profiles serve an important identity-building function," by "provid[ing] a
unique . . . forum for identity creation and exploration." Id. Second, privacy is necessary for
individuals to preserve dignity and develop personality. Id. at 84-85. Third, voluntary disclosures
online promote intimacy and socialization. Id. at 85-86. And fourth, privacy is necessary to
encourage free discourse on OSNs. Id. at 86-87. Surveillance and unwanted sharing of personal
communications stifle this free discourse. Id.
24. See Allyson W. Haynes, The Short Arm of the Law: Simplifying Personal
Jurisdiction Over Virtually Present Defendants, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 133 (2009) (analyzing the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants based on Internet contacts by examining
precedent dealing with offline contacts); see also Allyson W. Haynes. Online Privacy Policies:
Contracting Away Control Over Personal Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 587 (2007)
(analyzing contract formation in the context of online privacy policies by analogizing to offline
contract formation).
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looks to offline precedent for guidance regarding how to define this
space.
II. OFFLINE PRIVACY: MOVING TOWARD INDIVIDUALS'
PRIVACY-ENHANCING EFFORTS
The distinction between "public" and "private" space underlies
many aspects of US privacy law. The Fourth Amendment protects
against searches and seizures where a person has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy," which he will not have in a public place.25
State tort law protects against the "public" disclosure of "private"
facts, but does not protect against the dissemination of information
already in the public sphere. 26 And tort law also protects against
unwanted "intrusion upon seclusion," which a person will not have in
a "public" place. 27 Underlying all of these areaS28 is the traditional
idea that what is public and private is a function of both physical
space and conscious exposure to others. 29
Privacy has traditionally been defined using a binary
distinction between public and private communications. 30  Also
described as the "secrecy paradigm,"31 some courts view privacy as an
all-or-nothing attribute.32 Professor Solove has been an effective critic
of this notion of privacy as secrecy, where "once a fact is divulged in
public, no matter how limited or narrow the disclosure, it can no
longer remain private."33 This narrow theory of privacy ignores the
concepts of autonomy and choice-"individuals want to keep things
25. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1967).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
27. See id. § 652B.
28. In addition, there are distinctions between speech on matters of public concern,
protected by the First Amendment, and "matters of purely private concern." Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) ("We have long recognized that not
all speech is of equal First Amendment importance."). This First Amendment concept underlies
the rules that the media may not be punished for a privacy violation where it has lawfully
obtained certain information. Fla. Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989). This Article does not
address the "public concern" aspect, focusing instead on the intrusion and disclosure aspects of
the public/private distinction. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758-59.
29. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 497 (2006).
30. Id.
31. Professor Daniel J. Solove coined this term in his article, A Taxonomy of Privacy.
See id.; infra Part II.A.3
32. See infra Part II.A.1.
33. Solove, supra note 5, at 1107; see also Solove, supra note 29 ("Under the secrecy
paradigm, privacy is tantamount to complete secrecy, and a privacy violation occurs when
concealed data is revealed to others. If the information is not previously hidden, then no privacy
interest is implicated by the collection or dissemination of the information. In many areas of law,
this narrow view of privacy has limited the recognition of privacy violations.").
[Vol. 14:3:603610
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private from some people but not others."3 4 As Professor Solove
explains:
[C]ourts generally find no privacy interest if information is in the public domain, if
people are monitored in public, if information is gathered in a public place, if no
intimate or embarrassing details are revealed, or if no new data is collected about a
person.... For disclosure, the secrecy of the information becomes a central dispositive
factor; this approach often misses the crux of the disclosure harm, which is not the
revelation of total secrets, but the spreading of information beyond expected
boundaries.
3 5
One contrasting theory considers privacy to include control over
information and disclosure. 36 While this theory, like the binary
secrecy paradigm, is too narrow in some respects, 37 it acknowledges
that privacy includes the right not just to determine whether certain
information will be disclosed, but the extent to which it will be
disclosed, and the uses to which it will be put.38
By analyzing how the traditional binary distinction has been
made and rejected in some offline instances, this Article analogizes to
more modern privacy issues. Online as offline, privacy should be
recognized as more complicated than simply black and white.
A. Common Law
Most scholars trace state common-law privacy to Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis's famous law review article published
in 1890.39 Warren and Brandeis advocated for "the right 'to be let
alone"' and a remedy for invasions of "the sacred precincts of private
and domestic life."40 They argued that the changes in technology and
34. Solove, supra note 5, at 1108.
35. Solove, supra note 29, at 563.
36. Solove, supra note 10, at 1113.
37. Id. at 1113-15 (noting that privacy-as-control omits the freedom to engage in certain
activities, as opposed to disclosure of information alone, and excludes many decisional aspects of
privacy, such as abortion and sexual freedom).
38. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining privacy as "the claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others"); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,
482 (1968) ("Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others;
rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves.").
39. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 124 (2007) ("According to the oft-told legend, the right to
privacy was born when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis penned The Right to Privacy in
1890."). See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
40. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 39, at 195.
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industrialization made protection of "the domestic circle" even more
important.41
Warren and Brandeis found seeds of privacy protection that
extended beyond intellectual and artistic property within existing case
law and that in fact "secures to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others."42 This right to privacy
necessarily has limits, including that it "ceases upon the publication of
the facts by the individual, or with his consent."43 But they recognized
that "a private communication or circulation for a restricted purpose is
not a publication within the meaning of the law."44
While the Warren & Brandeis article is considered the
foundation of modern privacy law, William Prosser, in 1960, first
delineated the privacy torts as we know them today.45 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts then recognized these torts collectively
under an "Invasion of Privacy" category.46 This category includes
Publicity Given to Private Life (or "publication of private facts"), 47
Appropriation of Name or Likeness, 48 Intrusion upon Seclusion,49 and
False Light.50 Now, fifty states have recognized some or all of these
torts, either as part of their common law or by legislation.5 1 The
relevant privacy torts for purposes of this Article are publication of
private facts and intrusion upon seclusion.
41. Id. at 196 ("The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining
influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have
become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through
invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be
inflicted by mere bodily injury.").
42. Id. at 198.
43. Id. at 218.
44. Id.
45. See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-I (1977).
47. Id. § 652D ("One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of
a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate
concern to the public.").
48. Id. § 652C. This tort provides a remedy against "[o]ne who appropriates to his own
use or benefit the name or likeness of another." Id.
49. Id. § 652B ("One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the
other [person] for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.").
50. Id. § 652E. This tort prohibits the knowing or reckless public disclosure of a matter
that places a person "in a false light" that "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id.
51. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 31 (3d ed.
2008).
[Vol. 14:3:603612
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1. The Binary Approach: Public or Private
There is no privacy in public communications-that is, in
anything a person himself makes public.52 For example, under the
Restatement's view of the tort of publication of private facts, a
plaintiff will not receive protection for facts he shared with the public:
There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information
about the plaintiff that is already public. . .. Similarly, there is no liability for giving
further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye. Thus he
normally cannot complain when his photograph is taken while he is walking down the
public street and is published in the defendant's newspaper.
5 3
Rather, the law protects those facts or communications that the
plaintiff "does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely to
himself or at most reveals only to his family or to close personal
friends."54 Similarly, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion requires
"intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has secluded himself."55
The invasion may include "opening his private and personal mail,
searching his safe or his wallet, [or] examining his private bank
account,"56 but will not include investigation into public matters.
As applied by the courts, a third party cannot invade a person's
privacy when that third party views, photographs, films, or overhears
the person on public streets or thoroughfares.5 7 In addition, courts
have found no privacy violation when the following photographs or
videotapes were taken: a couple at a farmers' market,58 people
standing in line in a government building to collect unemployment
compensation, 59 a student in a classroom and hallway of a school
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b.
54. Id. (emphasis added). The Comment's language itself provides some relief from a
view of privacy as utter secrecy. See id.
55. Id. § 652B cmt. b.
56. Id.
57. Jackson v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 11 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that
there was no invasion of privacy by publication of photograph of policewoman with three minors
on a public sidewalk); Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. 1963) (stating that there is
no right to privacy based on surveillance "in the open on public thoroughfares where appellant's
activities could be observed by passers-by"); Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 859 (R.L 1998)
(holding that there was no privacy violation when a neighbor photographed and documented
activity taking place in full view of a public street).
58. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953) (stating that there is no
right to privacy based on plaintiffs' "voluntary assumption of [a] particular pose in a public
place," where the defendant published a picture of plaintiffs at their place of business in a busy
farmers' market).
59. Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) ("The
appearance of a person in a public place necessarily involves doffing the cloak of privacy which
the law protects.").
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building during regular school hours,60 a person in a courtroom,61 in a
restaurant, 62 on a cruise ship, 63 or in a church during a service open to
the public. 64 Courts have found no privacy interest at a public spa, 65
health club,66 or in a college's office space that was visible to
employees and participants in the college program.67 There is little
gray area in the case law: typically, a space is open to the public or
not.
2. Exceptions to the Traditional Rule
Courts have recognized two primary exceptions to the rule that
a person lacks a right to privacy in a "public" place. First, privacy
yields to security when the invasion rises to the level of harassment.
Second, some activities are considered inherently private, thereby
privatizing an otherwise public space.
a. Harassment or "Overzealous Surveillance"
First, a right to privacy will be implicated even in public when
it rises to the level of harassment, particularly where children are
involved.68 Thus, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Galella v. Onassis upheld an injunction prohibiting a paparazzo from
60. Jarrett v. Butts, 379 S.E.2d 583, 584-85 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
61. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 958-59, 963 (D. Minn.
1948) (finding no invasion of privacy when photographer took picture of plaintiff in courtroom
and used it to illustrate a story about plaintiffs divorce and custody proceedings, which were of
legitimate interest to the public).
62. Dempsey v. Nat'l Enquirer, 702 F. Supp. 927, 931 (D. Me. 1988); Wilkins v. NBC, 84
Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 336 (Ct. App. 1999).
63. Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 483 (D. Me. 1987) (finding no
invasion of privacy based on photographers taking pictures and harassing passenger on cruise
ship, although plaintiff stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 845 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1988).
64. Creel v. I.C.E. & Assocs., 771 N.E.2d 1276, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
videotaping in a courtroom did not violate privacy where it "simply captured activity that was
open to the public, observed by many, . . . which [anyone attending] could have testified to
witnessing at trial").
65. Garmley v. Opryland Hotel Nashville, LLC, No. 3:07-0681, 2007 WL 4376078, at *3
(M.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 2007) (rejecting claim for publication of private facts where the facts involve
plaintiffs conduct with a member of the public, a massage therapist at a commercial spa); see
also Wigginess, Inc. v. Fruchtman, 482 F. Supp. 681, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1346
(2d Cir. 1980).
66. Foster v. Livingwell Midwest, Inc., No. 88-5340, 1988 WL 134497, at *2 (6th Cir.
Dec. 16, 1988) (affirming lower court's finding of no privacy claim where plaintiff was filmed
while exercising at the health spa where she was a member).
67. Nelson v. Salem State Coll., 845 N.E.2d 338, 346-47 (Mass. 2006).
68. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1973); Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F.
Supp. 664, 684 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1433-34 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
But see Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513-14 (Tex. 1993).
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approaching the defendant Onassis within twenty-five feet or touching
her, from blocking her movement in public places and thoroughfares,
from any act that would place her life and safety in jeopardy, and from
harassing, alarming, or frightening her.6 9 Similarly, in Wolfson v.
Lewis, the court ordered an injunction against surveillance and
harassment of a family of healthcare executives, finding the tort of
intrusion to protect against "[c]onduct that amounts to a persistent
course of hounding, harassment and unreasonable surveillance, even
if conducted in a public or semi-public place." 0
b. Inherently Private Activity
Second, courts find a right to privacy in locations that are open
to the public when the nature of the activity is inherently private; that
is, activities involving bodily functions, health, reproduction, or
nudity. Thus, in Huskey v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., a prisoner
filmed in an "exercise cage" wearing only gym shorts who alleged that
he was engaged in "private activities" stated a claim for invasion of
privacy.71  An employer violated employees' right to privacy by
installing a hidden camera in a nurse manager's office where medical
examinations took place.72  A tanning salon owner violated a
customer's privacy by secretly watching and photographing her while
she undressed and tanned in the tanning room. 73 A hospital violated a
patient's right to privacy when a nurse's husband viewed her delivery
of a baby.74 And a breast cancer patient's privacy was invaded when a
drug salesman was allowed to observe her breast exam. 5 Courts have
likewise found a right to privacy in a hospital room with respect to
non-hospital personnel,76 and in the emergency room.77 They have
found a right to privacy in public restrooms78 and changing rooms.79
69. Galella, 487 F.2d at 998.
70. Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at 1420-21, 1435 (emphasizing that such a cause of action in
Pennsylvania would require substantial, offensive, and intentional intrusion upon the plaintiffs'
seclusion).
71. Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
72. Acuff v. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914, 921 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
73. Sabrina W. v. Willman, 540 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
74. Knight v. Penobscot Bay Med. Ctr., 420 A.2d 915, 916-17 (Me. 1980).
75. Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharm., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 410, 418-20 (Ct. App. 2001).
76. People v. Brown, 151 Cal. Rptr. 749, 754-55 (Ct. App. 1979).
77. Castro v. NYT Television, 851 A.2d 88, 96-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)
(noting that defendants concede plaintiffs stated a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion).
78. Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (finding invasion of
privacy based on installation of hidden viewing devices in public restroom at skating rink). But
see Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123-25 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding plaintiff had no
privacy claim in a film of her kissing a man in a bathroom stall).
79. Bevan v. Smartt, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1158, 1161-62 (D. Utah 2004).
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And they have found a right to privacy in an otherwise public place
where an inadvertently embarrassing or revealing pose is captured.80
This exception is, however, a narrow one.81
3. Movement Away From the Binary Approach
In addition to the traditional exceptions noted above, some
courts have embraced a more nuanced view of the privacy torts than
the binary distinction between public and private communications or
activities. These courts, in effect, recognize that privacy is not
equivalent to secrecy, but should be viewed in context. And
importantly, many courts find determinative individuals' own efforts
to preserve the area as private.
In Nader v. General Motors Corp., the New York Court of
Appeals found sufficient allegations of invasion of privacy based on
"overzealous" surveillance and recognized that a person's own actions
in maintaining privacy-even in public-are relevant:82
A person does not automatically make public everything he does merely by being in a
public place, and the mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not give anyone the right
to try to discover the amount of money he was withdrawing. On the other hand, if the
plaintiff acted in such a way as to reveal that fact to any casual observer, then, it may
not be said that the appellant intruded into his private sphere.
8 3
The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit similarly found
an invasion of privacy when a supervisor secretly recorded the
conversations of four employees who worked in an open area. 84 The
court concluded that the employees' expectation of privacy was
objectively reasonable because, despite the open workspace, "the
employees took great care to ensure that their conversations remained
private" and the office was a "small, relatively isolated space," where
"[t]he employees could be sure that no one was in the building without
their knowledge."85
Other courts have also looked beyond the fact that a place is
open to the public when an employee alleges a violation of privacy on
company property. In K-mart Corp. Store Number 7441 v. Trotti, the
Texas Court of Appeals upheld a claim by an employee for intrusion
80. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 476, 478 (Ala. 1964).
81. See McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. App. 1991)
(finding no invasion of privacy when picture was taken in public place and genitals were
accidentally exposed).
82. Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
83. Id. at 771.
84. Dorris v. Absher, 179 F.3d 420, 423-25 (6th Cir. 1999).
85. Id. at 425 ("The conversations took place only when no one else was present, and
stopped when the telephone was being used or anyone turned onto the gravel road that was the
only entrance to the office.").
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upon seclusion when the employer searched a locker on company
premises.86 The court found it important that, while the lockers were
the property of the employer, the employer allowed employees to
purchase and use their own locks to secure personal belongings in the
lockers.87  Therefore, the employee "demonstrated a legitimate
expectation to a right of privacy in both the locker itself and those
personal effects within it."88
Likewise, the California Supreme Court found that an
employee of a telepsychic marketing company, whom an undercover
reporter had surreptitiously recorded, had a claim for intrusion upon
seclusion despite the fact that other employees could hear the
conversation.89 The court held that, even though the plaintiff may
have lacked "a reasonable expectation of complete privacy in a
conversation because it could be seen and overheard by coworkers (but
not the general public)," there was still a basis for a privacy claim.90
While the court acknowledged that its holding in Shulman v. Group W
Productions, Inc. required "an objectively reasonable expectation of
seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data source,"91 it
rejected the notion that privacy was an all-or-nothing concept:
"neither in Shulman nor in any other case have we stated that an
expectation of privacy, in order to be reasonable for purposes of the
intrusion tort, must be of absolute or complete privacy."92
Instead, videotaping in public may intrude on privacy even
when the events are visible and audible to others. The court referred
to its holding as "an expectation of limited privacy":
[P]rivacy, for purposes of the intrusion tort, is not a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic.
There are degrees and nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of privacy: the
86. K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Tex. App. 1984)
("Where ... the employee purchases and uses his own lock on the lockers, with the employer's
knowledge, the fact finder is justified in concluding that the employee manifested, and the
employer recognized, an expectation that the locker and its contents would be free from intrusion
and interference.").
87. Id.
88. Id. at 638.
89. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1999).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Schulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 491 (Cal. 1998). The court reversed
the finding of the Court of Appeals that "plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy at
the accident scene itself because the scene was within the sight and hearing of members of the
public." Id. Rather, the court found that "[flrom the tapes it appears unlikely the plaintiffs'
extrication from their car and medical treatment at the scene could have been observed by any
persons who, in the lower court's words, 'passed by' on the roadway." Id. The Court continued:
"[a] patient's conversation with a provider of medical care in the course of treatment, including
emergency treatment, carries a traditional and legally well-established expectation of privacy."
Id. at 491-92.
92. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 71-72.
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fact that the privacy one expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not
render the expectation unreasonable as a matter of law. Although the intrusion tort is
often defined in terms of "seclusion," the seclusion referred to need not be absolute.
"Like 'privacy,' the concept of 'seclusion' is relative. The mere fact that a person can be
seen by someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally be forced to be
subject to being seen by everyone."' 9 3
The recognition that privacy involves interests beyond secrecy
or seclusion underlies the Supreme Court's decision in United States
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
where the Court found that the privacy exemption of the Freedom of
Information Act precluded the release of FBI "rap sheets" despite the
fact that those records constituted compilations of information
previously publicly disclosed. 94 The Court noted that few facts are
completely undisclosed, and that there is a salient distinction between
"scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap
sheet" and divulgence of the rap sheet itself.95
Since Professor Solove published his Conceptualizing Privacy
article in 2002, two Circuit Courts of Appeals have recognized the
salience of his distinction between privacy-as-secrecy and
privacy-as-control, both in the context of analyzing conflicts between
privacy interests and First Amendment protection. First, in 2009, in
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals considered the validity of the Federal
Communications Commission's 2007 order implementing the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 specifying how telecommunications
carriers are to obtain their customers' approval for the sharing of
personal information. 96 Rejecting the approach of the US Court of
Appeals for Tenth Circuit in U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC,97 the court found
that the Commission's order did not violate the First Amendment
rights of the carriers under the balancing required by Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York. 98
While the Tenth Circuit believed that the government interest at
93. Id. at 72 (citations omitted) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5. 10(A)(2) (1998)).
94. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
780 (1989).
95. Id. at 764; see also Solove, supra note 5, at 1109.
96. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 555 F.3d 996, 997-1000 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(construing Implementation of the Telecomms. Act of 1996: Telecomms. Carriers' Use of
Customer Proprietary Network Info. and Other Customer Info.; IP-Enabled Servs., 22 F.C.C.
Rcd. 6927 (2007)).
97. U.S. W., Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999).
98. Nat'l Cable, 555 F.3d at 1000-02 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
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stake was preventing the disclosure of embarrassing information,"9
the DC Circuit found that the privacy interest was of a different sort:
[W]e do not agree that the interest in protecting customer privacy is confined to
preventing embarrassment as the Tenth Circuit thought. There is a good deal more to
privacy than that. It is widely accepted that privacy deals with determining for oneself
when, how and to whom personal information will be disclosed to others. The Supreme
Court knows this as well as Congress: "both the common law and the literal
understandings of privacy encompass the individual's control of information concerning
his or her person."
1 00
A year later, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Ostergren v. Cuccinelli rejected the secrecy paradigm in determining
whether the application of a Virginia law prohibiting the publication
of social security numbers would be unconstitutional as applied to the
posting of Virginia land records on a privacy advocate's website.101
The court noted that the privacy interest in preventing disclosure of
social security numbers involved "a different conception of privacy not
predicated on secrecy."102 Unlike the release of the name of a rape
victim or juvenile defendant's identity, disclosure of a social security
number is not potentially embarrassing or compromising; rather, this
case involved "a particular conception of privacy whereby one does not
mind publicity itself but nonetheless would prefer to control how
personal information will be used or handled."103 The court quoted the
US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in rejecting the limitations of
the secrecy paradigm: "Under this conception, privacy does not hinge
upon secrecy but instead involves 'the individual's control of
information concerning his or her person.'"
104
Thus, many courts have moved away from the binary view of
privacy as secrecy, and toward recognition that privacy includes a
right to control disclosure. 105 The extent to which the individual tries
to wield that control is determinative.
99. U.S. W., Inc., 182 F.3d at 1235.
100. Nat'l Cable, 555 F.3d at 1001 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989)) (citing Solove, supra note 5, at 1109-10).
101. Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 290 (4th Cir. 2010).
102. Id. at 282.
103. Id. at 282-83.
104. Id. at 283 (quoting Nat'l Cable, 555 F.3d at 1001).
105. See Cook v. WHDH-TV, Inc., No. 941269, 1999 WL 1327222 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar.
4, 1999). The court found that the plaintiff stated a claim for intrusion upon seclusion under a
Massachusetts's statute prohibiting "unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his
privacy," despite the fact that the intrusion at issue occurred while plaintiff was approached in
his car, with his son, and in line at a Burger King drive-through. Id. at *5 (quoting MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 214, § lB (2011)). In doing so, the court rejected the argument that plaintiff voluntarily
assumed the risk of being observed by being in a public place. Id. The plaintiff "was entitled to
have a jury consider such factors as the defendant's motive for the intrusion; the extent or
invasiveness of the intrusion; whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of being free
from such an intrusion; and whether the plaintiff consented." Id. The court explained that "the
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B. The Fourth Amendment
Fourth Amendment analysis also shows a move from privacy as
a binary or all-or-nothing concept toward a focus on context. The
Fourth Amendment prohibits government agents from engaging in
unreasonable searches and seizures. 06 Fourth Amendment searches
are relevant here in two contexts: searches for criminal wrongdoing,
and searches in a government-employment setting. 107 In both areas,
courts have analyzed the existence of a person's reasonable
expectations of privacy to determine whether a search has in fact
occurred.108 If there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, then
there is no search at all.
The Supreme Court originally held that only physical
trespasses into private spaces qualified as searches under the Fourth
Amendment.109 Thus, the quintessential protection of the Fourth
Amendment was against searches of private homes.110  Fourth
Amendment analysis underwent a significant change after the
landmark case of United States v. Katz."' There, the Court
abandoned the "trespass" requirement, and indeed any focus on the
specific "place" intruded upon by the government,112 and instead found
that a search may in fact take place even in a public place, so long as
the person "seeks to preserve [that place] as private."113 As Justice
rigid application of invasion of privacy tort law to invasions occurring in public places ought not
deprive Mr. Cook of the judgment of a jury of his peers as to whether defendants unreasonably
and substantially or seriously invaded his privacy." Id. The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit also found a possible invasion of privacy despite the fact that the invasion occurred in a
public restaurant. Evans v. Detlefsen, 857 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 1988).
The short answer to the defendant's argument [that there could be no intrusion into
the plaintiffs seclusion in a public restaurant] is that the privacy which is invaded
has to do with the type of interest involved and not the place where the invasion
occurs... . Although the place of the occurrence is relevant to a determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence of intrusiveness, it is not determinative of whether an
intrusion into one's 'solitude and seclusion' has occurred.
Id.; see also Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 501 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
invasion of a couple's privacy by the publication of a video showing them at an in vitro
fertilization gathering, where they were assured the event would remain private, they refused to
be interviewed, and they made every effort to remain off-camera).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
107. See Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government even when
the government acts as an employer).
108. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1967); Leventhal, 266 F.3d at 73.
109. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928).
110. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
111. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
112. Id. at 353; see also id. at 351 ("[The Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.").
113. Id. at 351.
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Harlan reasoned in his concurrence, the Fourth Amendment's
protections require "first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 114 Thus,
despite the fact that the government in Katz did not trespass inside
the public telephone booth while wiretapping the defendant's
conversations, "[t]he critical fact [was] that 'one who occupies it . . .
shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place
a call is surely entitled to assume' that his conversation is not being
intercepted."115 In other words, the existence of an expectation of
privacy does not depend on the place searched being completely
"public" or "private"-rather, "it is a temporarily private place whose
momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are
recognized as reasonable."116
Even privacy in the home, which has historically received
prototypical protection, can be lost if the home is open to "plain
view.""' Courts look at the "effort on the part of the occupants to
make [a] room secret and protect their privacy," 18 and a person's
"actual attempts to safeguard his private affairs."119 Since Katz, the
Supreme Court has found a reasonable expectation of privacy to exist
in the interior of a car,120 and in the interior of a person's purse or
luggage,121 even though the car or the luggage is in a public place.
Also, like the temporary privacy a person has in a public telephone
booth when he enters and shuts the door, a person has a limited
114. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
115. Id. (quoting id. at 352 (majority opinion)).
116. Id.
117. Id. ("Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected'
because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand,
conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.").
118. People v. Walker, 80 Cal. Rptr. 531, 533 (Ct. App. 1969).
119. State v. Morris, 961 P.2d 653, 657 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the defendant
"took no steps to cover the window in order to shield his activities from the view of passersby");
cf. State v. Fortmeyer, 37 P.3d 223, 226 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that "defendants took extra
measures to try to protect their privacy in their home").
120. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
121. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
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expectation of privacy in a public restroom, 122 hospital room, 123
changing room, 124 and hotel room. 125
The Supreme Court has also recognized that a public employee
can have an expectation of privacy in his place of work. 126  In
O'Connor v. Ortega, the Court "delineate[d] the boundaries of the
workplace context," which include "those areas and items that are
related to work and are generally within the employer's control."127
Whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy within
those boundaries will depend on context. 128 Some "offices may be so
open to. . . the public" that the employee lacks any reasonable
expectation of privacy there. 129 In addition to looking at how the
particular office space is used, the Court noted that it would be
relevant if the employer had a policy in place regarding the use of
offices and the privacy that might be expected therein. 130
One important doctrine limiting reasonable expectations of
privacy in Fourth Amendment cases is the third-party doctrine, which
finds that a person has no expectation of privacy in communications
voluntarily provided to a third party. 131 In Smith v. Maryland, the
Supreme Court found that the use of a pen register, which records
numbers dialed from a telephone line, is not a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 132 The Court found that people do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial because
they "realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone
company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment
that their calls are completed." 133 In addition, the Court distinguished
pen registers from more intrusive surveillance on the basis that "pen
registers do not acquire the contents of communications." 34
122. United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 1989); Barron v. State, 823
P.2d 17, 20 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); State v. Powers, 991 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
123. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
124. People v. Diaz, 376 N.Y.S. 2d 849, 854-55 (1975); State v. McDaniel, 337 N.E.2d 173,
177 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
125. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964).
126. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).
127. Id. at 715.
128. Id. at 717 ("Public employees' expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file
cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of
actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.").
129. Id. at 717-18.
130. Id. at 717.
131. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
132. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 741.
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An analogous aspect of the third-party doctrine is the
"misplaced trust" doctrine used by the Supreme Court in Hoffa v.
United States.135  Under this rule, a person lacks a reasonable
expectation of privacy in communications made to another party if the
other party turns out to be a government informant.136 Similarly,
there is no protection against that other party to the communication
then turning the information over to the authorities.137
Thus in common law and Fourth Amendment offline contexts,
expectations of privacy can exist in limited circumstances despite the
fact that communications occurred in a public context or were
disclosed to third parties. The important question is whether the
person has sought to preserve the area as private, and whether his
expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.138
C. Statutory Privacy Law
In addition to tort law and Fourth Amendment issues, there
are many federal and state statutes dealing with privacy interests.
The statutes invoked most in the context of invasions of privacy online
are Title I and Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA).139 Title I, or the Wiretap Act, prohibits the interception of
electronic communications in transit.140  Title II, or the Stored
Communications Act (SCA), regulates accessing of stored electronic
communications and records. 141 When claims are brought under these
statutes, they raise the issue of whether a party has intercepted an
electronic communication or accessed a stored communication without
authorization. 142 There is no protection for communications that are
"readily accessible to the public."143  Thus, the question of
authorization and ready accessibility to the public often overlaps with
135. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); see also Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966).
136. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (holding that there is no protection under the Fourth
Amendment for "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides
his wrongdoing will not reveal it").
137. See, e.g., United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1195 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding no
expectation of privacy in letters provided to the government by a private individual).
138. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984).
139. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2712
(2006).
140. Id. §§ 2510-2522.
141. Id. §§ 2701-2712.
142. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879-80 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
143. Konop, 302 F.3d at 875 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 41, 62-63 (1986)).
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the existence of a protected privacy interest in the intercepted
communications. 144
III. ONLINE PRIVACY: RECOGNIZING USER CONTROLS AS
"PRIVACY-ENHANCING EFFORTS"
As courts' analyses of reasonable expectations of privacy have
shifted to the online context, courts have used analogies to previous
communication methods like first-class mail and the telephone. 145
They have struggled with the public versus private distinction in a
nonphysical context, 146 and with the fact that some Internet
communications necessarily involve disclosure to third parties. 147
Some courts have mistakenly resorted to an over-simplified view of
privacy interests. 148 But there is also a line of authority finding a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of online
communications, depending upon an analysis of the user controls, or
the equivalent of shutting virtual doors or covering virtual windows. 149
A. Brief Description of Online Communications and User Controls
In offline contexts, as discussed above, courts have given effect
to people's efforts to ensure privacy by closing doors and blinds,
employing locks, and otherwise conforming their activity to increase
144. See Shefts v. Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620, 633 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (finding notice of
monitoring of communications in employee manual defeated claims based on ECPA and
reasonable expectation of privacy under Illinois Eavesdropping Statute); see also City of Ont. v.
Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010) (noting respondents' argument that the existence of a
statutory protection under the SCA renders a search per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, and stating that "the precedents counsel otherwise").
145. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509, 511 (9th Cir. 2007).
146. See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1012 (2010) (describing the difficulty in applying the Fourth
Amendment to the Internet, where the traditional inside/outside distinction "no longer works").
147. See Patricia Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 25 (2007) ("In cyberspace, the complete secrecy requirement of privacy torts is
difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy. Total secrecy is difficult offline; this difficulty is magnified
online. No information placed on OSNs is completely secret, even if a profile is set to private. ...
Any information posted on OSNs-even if never actually transmitted to another-is not
completely secret. This is because anything posted on OSNs is accessible to a third party-the
OSNs themselves.").
148. See infra Part III.B.2.i.
149. See United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007); Konop v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Google Inc. St. View Elec.
Commc'ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1083-84 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Brown-Criscuolo v. Wolfe, 601
F. Supp. 2d 441, 449-50 (D. Conn. 2009); United States v. Long, 64 M.J. 57, 64-65 (C.A.A.F.
2006).
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its private nature.150 Online, analogous privacy measures include
passwords, encryption techniques, privacy settings, and other methods
of controlling the privacy of communications. 15 1 This Article focuses
on four categories of Internet communication: email, websites, files
shared via the Internet, and online social networks. The following
Sections provide a brief description of how user controls may operate
in each of those communication technologies.
1. Email
In our society, people typically use either workplace email or
private email systems. 152 In the case of workplace email, the employer
will typically have a policy governing the use of that email and the
privacy given to it.153 An employee whose employer monitors his
email and notifies him of that monitoring via, for example, banner
warnings each time she logs onto the computer, will not receive as
much privacy protection as an employee whose employer does not
monitor or access employee email. 154 Also important is whether the
employee has a password that is unknown to the employer, and
whether the employer has a right of access to the employee's email. 155
With private email, the relevant policy is between the user and the
email service or Internet service provider (ISP) to which that user
subscribes.156  Some subscriber agreements provide for the ISP's
provision of subscriber information to third parties, while others
emphasize that they will not share subscriber information without a
warrant.
Whatever system provides the email, the privacy of its
component parts may be treated differently. As discussed further
150. See Dorris v. Absher, 179 F.3d 420, 425 (6th Cir. 1999); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
255 N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (N.Y. 1970); K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 637
(Tex. App. 1984).
151. See infra Part III.B.
152. "More than half of working adults (53 [percent]) have both personal and work email
accounts." Mary Madden & Sydney Jones, Networked Workers, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 24,
2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/966/. "And while 22 [percent] say they maintain only a
personal account, just 5 [percent] say that their email use is limited to a work account.
Personal email spills over to the cell phone and Blackberry, too . . . ." Id.
153. See, e.g., Brown-Criscuolo, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 449-50 (describing employer's
"Acceptable Use Policy" controlling the use of its computer system).
154. Cf. id. at 449 (listing factors to determine reasonable privacy expectations, such as
whether the company monitors the employee's computer or email use and whether the employee
is aware of company policy).
155. See id. at 449-50.
156. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (describing AOL's
contractual agreement with its email subscribers and policies in terms of reading or disclosing
subscribers' emails).
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below, the "to" and "from" addressing or "envelope" information is
considered "non-content" information, while the actual message within
the email is considered "content."5 7 As with postal mail, courts have
generally found no right to privacy in non-content information, while
being more amenable to such a right in content information.158 An
employee's choice to either use an email system that his employer
monitors and can access or a system that promises not to disclose
information to third parties greatly affects the privacy of the email's
''content."
2. Files Shared Via the Internet
Another way in which Internet users exchange information is
through peer-to-peer sharing of computer files via Internet
networks.' 59 One example of a service that allows file-sharing is
LimeWire.160 A person who signs up for the software service and
shares files on the service makes those files available to any other
user of the software.161  Another example is iTunes, the Apple
software that enables users to share some of the content they
maintain in their own iTunes files with other iTunes users.162 The
particular software or service will govern the specifics of when and
how it allows such sharing. The user of open file sharing-whereby
any user of the service may view the files shared by another user-will
receive less protection from disclosure than the user of a file-sharing
service that limits access to others. 163 In the wireless context,
157. See Kerr, supra note 146, at 1019-20 ("The addressing (or 'envelope') information is
the data that the network uses to deliver the communications to or from the user; the content
information is the payload that the user sends or receives.").
158. Id. at 1021-29.
159. Cf. United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI,
2010 WL 373994, at *6 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010).
160. LIMEWIRE, http://www.limewire.com (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). LimeWire was
forced to shut down in 2010 due to copyright complaints. Edward Moyer, Little Juice Left in Lime
Wire, CNET NEWS (Dec. 4, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-20024651-93.html.
161. See United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1046-47 (9th Cir.) (describing
LimeWire as "a publically [sic] available peer-to-peer file-sharing computer program"), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010). In Borowy, a FBI agent, who was monitoring trafficking in child
pornography, accessed LimeWire to download pornography files shared on the service by the
defendant. Id.
162. iTunes, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/?cid=OAS-US-DOMAINS-itunes.com
(last visited Jan. 26, 2012); see Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *6.
163. See infra Part III.B.3. Compare Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d at 1146-47 (finding a
reasonable expectation of privacy in computer files despite the computer's connection to the
employer's network, where the employer's policy did not provide for active monitoring of the
employee's computer usage), with United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000)
(finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in files downloaded from the Internet where the
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encrypted or secure networks will lead to privacy protection more than
unsecured, open-access networks.164
3. Information Posted on a Website
This category includes an Internet user's decision to post a
message on a website's message board or discussion forum, or in a
chat room.165 A message board or discussion forum is a feature that
allows users to post and read messages, much like a virtual "bulletin
board." 66 Chat rooms are webpages in which Internet users have
"real-time" conversations with each other by posting and receiving
instantaneous messages.167 This category also includes a user posting
information, photographs, videos, or other data onto a website,
including data created by the specific user.168 Relevant to the privacy
of such postings are, again, any subscriber agreement between the ISP
and the Internet user, in addition to whether a password or other
method protects the website from access.169 Like the email addressing
information, information provided to ISPs is considered "non-content,"
while actual pages viewed would be considered "content."170 A person
who posts information on a website or chat room may control the
user's employer policy provided for auditing, inspecting, and monitoring of employees' Internet
use).
164. See infra Part III.B.3. Compare Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *6 (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy where the defendant used an unsecured wireless network and
set his iTunes software preferences to allow sharing of his files with any other user of the
network), with In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc'ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1083 (N.D.
Cal. 2011) (finding a claim under the Wiretap Act where Google accessed users' networks, which
were configured to render communications unreadable and inaccessible without the use of
special software).
165. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 331-32 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Maxwell, 45
M.J. 406, 411 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
166. United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 417 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("A computer
bulletin board system is a computer program that simulates an actual bulletin board by allowing
computer users who access a particular computer to post messages, read existing messages, and
delete messages."). Note that the more modern use of the term "bulletin board system" refers to a
service with considerably more functionality. See Guest, 255 F.3d at 331-32 (describing one
bulletin board system that allows users to send email to subscribers, participate in chat room
conversations or online games, or post or read messages on many topics).
167. Chat rooms have different levels of privacy. See Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 411 (describing
chat conversations on AOL that take place in either a "public room" or a "private room").
168. See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 415 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)
(describing a website created by student that "consisted of several web pages that made
derogatory comments about Student's algebra teacher [and principal]"), affd, 807 A.2d 847 (Pa.
2002).
169. See id. at 425 (describing student-created website that was "not a protected site,
meaning that only certain viewers could access the site by use of a known password" and was
accessible by links from other sites or by a user "stumbl[ing] upon" it when using certain search
terms).
170. See Kerr, supra note 146, at 1029-30.
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privacy of that posting by ensuring that the website is not open to the
public but is protected by passwords or other techniques.
4. Online Social Networks
While the communications and information shared on OSNs
overlap with some of the above descriptions, this Article treats OSNs
separately because these activities occur under a single network in an
OSN, and because OSNs are tremendously popular. Nearly half of all
adults, or 50 percent of Internet users, say they use at least one
OSN.171 The most popular OSN is Facebook, boasting a membership
of 92 percent of OSN members.17 2 The second most popular is
MySpace with 29 percent. 173 On an OSN, a user can send email
messages to another user or "chat" in real time similar to the online
chats discussed above. 174 A user creates his own "profile," where he
can post information, photographs, or other data-and users may post
such items on each other's profiles.175 The user chooses the intended
audience for these posts by enabling privacy settings that control who
has access to the user's posts within the website.176 Such settings can
be as broad as "public," allowing viewing by anyone on the Internet, or
as narrow as the user chooses.177 Every OSN has a subscriber
agreement with the specific user governing the terms of use and
setting out privacy provisions.178 The user controls include the user's
choice to share information with a limited audience versus sharing
with the public at large.
B. The Law's Treatment of Online Privacy
Applying traditional notions of privacy is problematic when it
comes to the Internet, which is not a "place" at all, 179 and where some
disclosure to a third party is a necessary predicate to communication
thereon.180 Under a strict application of the law, there is by definition
171. 65% of Online Adults Use Social Networking Sites, supra note 17.
172. Rainie et al., supra note 21.
173. Id.
174. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 976-77 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
175. Id. at 977.
176. See, e.g., Abril, supra note 147, at 14-15.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Romano v. Steelease Inc., 907 N.Y.S. 2d 650, 656-57 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
179. See Kerr, supra note 146 (describing the lack of an "inside/outside distinction" on
the Internet).
180. See United States v. D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information, length of stored files, and other
non-content information provided to ISPs), vacated, 648 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011).
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no right of privacy on the Internet, either because it is seen as "public"
and not "private,"181 or because communicating via the Internet
necessitates sharing with a third party.182 Therefore it is critical in
the online context that courts employ the broader, non-binary view of
privacy that includes controlling the extent of disclosure, as opposed to
the focus on preventing any disclosure at all. As noted above,
information posted or communications divulged on the Internet are,
out of necessity, divulged to third parties. And secondly, in a binary
world, the Internet is clearly more likely to be viewed as public than
private.
This Article asks whether the exceptions made by courts in the
offline context to the rule of no privacy in a "public" place can be
extended to the online sphere. There are two problems with the online
application of these exceptions. First, Internet privacy cases are not
easily analogized to the exception made offline for cases involving
harassment or overzealous surveillance in a public place.183 Also
problematic is the exception for inherently private activity, because
the Internet has no equivalent of a restroom or changing room. 84
Instead, the best analogy to offline privacy in an otherwise public
place is the recognition of individuals' privacy-ensuring measures.
Courts should look at evolving custom and social mores in determining
the reasonableness of online privacy expectations, and to the one tool
that exists both offline and online for those seeking to preserve
privacy expectations, the affirmative use of available privacy controls.
Recognition of such "user controls" is essential for allowing some
privacy in the online context.185
181. See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 863 (Ct. App. 2009) ("By
posting the article on MySpace.com, Cynthia opened the article to the public at large. Her
potential audience was vast.").
182. DAndrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
183. The closest analogy may be to cases alleging harassment in the context of "virtual
worlds." See Michael J. Bugeja, Second Thoughts About Second Life, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Sept. 14, 2007), http://chronicle.com/article/Second-Thoughts-About-Secon/46636 (describing
allegations of virtual sexual harassment and even rape in Second Life).
184. There could be special protection for communications or postings concerning or
displaying inherently private activity in Internet spaces set up specifically for that activity,
although the court would have to find the disclosure was not purposeful. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977) (noting that a person has no claim for violation of
privacy in a matter purposefully revealed to the public). In an early Internet case, Michaels v.
Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., the court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a sex tape, despite the fact that part of the
tape had been leaked on the Internet. Michaels v. Internet Entm't Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823,
840-41 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
185. See DAndrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (arguing that individual privacy-enhancing
measures such as password-protection should, like "locks, bolts, and burglar alarms," evidence a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of that website (quoting 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6, at 721 (4th ed. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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1. Non-Content Addressing and Subscriber Information
One area where courts have consistently found no expectation
of privacy is with respect to email to and from addresses, including
Internet protocol (IP) addresses. Here, the courts analogize to the
content versus non-content distinction made in Smith v. Maryland
with respect to pen registers. As the US Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated in United States v. Forrester:
Smith based its holding that telephone users have no expectation of privacy in the
numbers they dial on the users' imputed knowledge that their calls are completed
through telephone company switching equipment. Analogously, e-mail and Internet
users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP
addresses of the websites they visit because they should know that this information is
provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing
the routing of the information. 1 8 6
In contrast, the underlying contents of email addresses or webpages
visited are protected: "[Tihe Court in Smith and Katz drew a clear line
between unprotected addressing information and protected content
information."187
Courts have looked at the agreement between the subscriber
and ISP "to assess whether a subscriber's subjective expectation of
privacy in his non-content subscriber information was one that society
would be willing to accept as objectively reasonable."188 Thus, the
court in United States v. Hambrick found no reasonable expectation of
privacy in subscriber information because the agreement between the
defendant and the ISP "did not proscribe MindSpring from revealing
defendant's personal information to nongovernmental entities."189
Likewise, in Freedman v. America Online, Inc., the court found that
an AOL user had no expectation of privacy when his subscriber
agreement "expressly informed Plaintiff that it may, in limited
circumstances, reveal his subscriber information."190
186. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted)
(citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742, 744 (1979)); see also Freedman v. AOL, Inc., 412 F.
Supp. 2d 174, 182-83 (D. Conn. 2005); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D.
Kan. 2000); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999), aff'd, 225 F.3d
656 (4th Cir. 2000).
187. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510.
188. Freedman, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 182.
189. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
190. Freedman, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
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2. Content of Email
a. Following the Misguided Approach of Privacy as Secrecy
In addition to finding a waiver of privacy based on voluntary
provision of non-content information to third parties, courts have also
followed the analogous "misplaced trust" doctrine to find no
expectation of privacy where third parties forward emails or chat room
communications to law enforcement officials.191  Certainly if the
recipient of an email or chat room communication either is a
government agent or in fact provides the communication to a
government agent, there is no privacy violation.192 But some courts
have taken that doctrine beyond a user accepting the risk that a
recipient of a communication will disclose it to the police. These
courts find no expectation of privacy to exist in email once the user
sends it simply because the email could be forwarded to others. 193
In the 1996 case United States v. Maxwell, the FBI obtained a
search warrant for AOL's computer bank in an investigation of child
pornography, and uncovered emails from the defendant's account.194
After his conviction, Maxwell appealed, challenging the search. 95
Because it found the search warrant to be invalid, the important issue
before the court was whether Maxwell had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his email to necessitate the warrant.196 The court found
that, even though a person may have a limited privacy interest under
the Fourth Amendment in email transmissions, that privacy
expectation disappears once the email is received and opened: "[T]he
transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that
police officials will not intercept the transmission without probable
cause and a search warrant. However, once the transmissions are
received by another person, the transmitter no longer controls its
destiny." 97
191. See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(finding no expectation of privacy in contents of an email once it is received, just as there is no
privacy in the contents of a letter "once the letter is received and opened" (quoting United States
v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996)) (internal quotations omitted)); Commonwealth v.
Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in
communications via email and chat room forwarded by the victim to the police).
192. See United States v. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (discussing the "misplaced
trust" doctrine).
193. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418-19 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
194. Id. at 413-14.
195. Id. at 415.
196. Id. at 419-24.
197. Id. at 418.
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A few other cases have favorably cited Maxwell's reasoning, but
without much analysis. 198  The court in Commonwealth v. Proetto
followed the reasoning of the Maxwell decision, but in Proetto the
email conversations were actually forwarded by their recipient to
police. 199 Therefore, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in
those emails (or in recorded chat room conversations provided to the
police) for purposes of the defendant's claims based on the Fourth
Amendment and the ECPA.200 The court did not need to employ the
broad reasoning in Maxwell because the case fell neatly within the
misplaced trust doctrine. But instead, the Proetto court stated that,
because the recipient of the email messages could forward them to
anyone, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
them.201
Other cases applying a rigid view of the third-party doctrine
include McLaren v. Microsoft Corp.,202 and Smyth v. Pillsbury
Company.203 In McLaren, the court found no legitimate expectation of
privacy in an employee's email for purposes of analyzing his intrusion
upon seclusion claim, despite the fact that the emails were stored
under a private, personal password with Microsoft's consent: "Even so,
any e-mail messages stored in McLaren's personal folders were first
transmitted over the network and were at some point accessible by a
third-party."204 Similarly, in Smyth, the court found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in emails sent over a company email system
and intercepted by company management, despite company
statements that all such email would remain private:
[W]e do not find a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications
voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor over the company e-mail system
notwithstanding any assurances that such communications would not be intercepted by
management. Once plaintiff communicated the alleged unprofessional comments to a
198. See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that an
individual may not have an expectation of privacy in email that has reached its recipient and
upholding the computer monitoring condition of probation, but remanding on issue of whether
the condition was overbroad); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding, inter alia,
no reasonable expectation of privacy in email that had already reached its recipient, although
there was a question as to whether email had been accessed at all); United States v. Valdivieso
Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (D.P.R. 2007) (finding that officers had probable cause for a
warrant seeking email subscriber information, and citing in passing authority for the proposition
that a person has no reasonable expectation in email already received).
199. Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. App. May
28, 1999).
203. Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (dismissing the employee's
claims for termination in violation of public policy and intrusion upon seclusion).
204. McLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *4.
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second person (his supervisor) over an e-mail system which was apparently utilized by
the entire company, any reasonable expectation of privacy was lost.20 5
The reasoning that finds email content no longer private once
received, or no longer private simply because the emails must be
transmitted over a network, is an unduly broad view of the misplaced
trust and third party doctrines. Instead, courts should not find such a
waiver of privacy simply because an email is received by its recipient.
Those messages should instead remain private as against third
parties, just as a conversation does not lose its privacy simply because
a party to it could have-but did not-share that communication with
another,206 and just as an opened letter may remain private in the
hands of its recipient.207
b. The Better Approach of Privacy As Control
The better line of authority finds no such waiver simply
because email has been sent and received. A growing number of
courts find a limited expectation of privacy in email, depending upon
the method of storage and privacy protection given to the email by the
specific email provider, as well as any representations made to the
email user about the privacy with which the messages will be
treated. 208
First, in the employment context, courts have begun to look at
whether the employer owns the computer or monitors the email
system. 209 In Brown-Criscuolo v. Wolfe, the court considered four
factors:
(1) does the corporation maintain a policy banning personal or other objectionable use,
(2) does the company monitor the use of the employee's computer or e-mail, (3) do third
205. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101.
206. The wiretapped conversation in Katz did not lose its privacy simply because the
other party to Katz's conversation could have shared its contents with the police. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
207. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1878). The Fourth Amendment protects "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." U.S. CONST. amend.
IV. The Supreme Court has noted in the context of the exclusionary rule that "[i]f letters and
private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of
an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . is of no value." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 648 (1961) (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)).
208. See Brown-Criscuolo v. Wolfe, 601 F. Supp. 2d 441, 449 (D. Conn. 2009); United
States v. Long, 64 M.J. 57, 62-65 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326, 330
(C.A.A.F. 2000); Hoff v. Spoelstra, Nos. 272898, 275979, 276054, 276257, 2008 WL 2668298, at
*9 (Mich. Ct. App. July 8, 2008).
209. See Brown-Criscuolo, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
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parties have a right of access to the computer or e-mails, and (4) did the corporation
notify the employee, or was the employee aware, of the use and monitoring policies?
2 10
In Brown-Criscuolo, the court found that the employee had an
expectation of privacy in her email based on these factors. 211 She had
a password to her account known only to her and the computer
system's administrator. 212 Moreover, the school district's computer
use policy confirmed that employees had a limited privacy interest in
their email, subject to routine maintenance and monitoring.213 In
addition, it was not, in fact, the practice of the school to monitor users'
email accounts. 214 Finally, the school superintendent accessed the
employee's email for a specific reason that was not pursuant to routine
maintenance and monitoring.215
Courts have looked at similar factors where the employer is the
government. In United States v. Monroe, the court found no
reasonable expectation of privacy in a US Air Force Staff Sergeant's
email on a government computer, when IT personnel discovered the
emails, and a banner warned the user at log-on that monitoring could
occur. 2 16 Also in Hoff v. Spoelstra, the court found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in emails on a city's computer system, where
the city's information systems policy stated that the emails were
considered public property, subject to Freedom of Information Act
requests, and that users should not expect any degree of privacy in
their email messages. 217  Thus, banner warnings and policy
statements can render unreasonable any expectation of privacy in an
employer email.
Even where the employer does monitor email, courts have
found a privacy interest to exist in some circumstances. Six years
after deciding Monroe, the same court found in United States v. Long
that the defendant retained a privacy interest in emails sent from and
stored on a government computer, despite a log-on banner warning
210. Id. (quoting In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2005)). In re Asia Global Crossing found the record inadequate to determine whether employees
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails on the company's server, where the company
had access to the emails, because the parties disputed whether the company's policy-which
limited email use to company business and warned of little privacy protection-was
communicated to employees. Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. at 260-61.
211. Brown-Criscuolo, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
212. Id. at 449.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 450.
215. Id.
216. United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326, 330 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
217. Hoff v. Spoelstra, Nos. 272898, 275979, 276054, 276257, 2008 WL 2668298, at *9
(Mich. Ct. App. July 8, 2008).
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that the computer was subject to monitoring.218 In this case, the
defendant had her own personal password that was not known to the
system administrator. 2 1 9 Furthermore, it was the administrator's
general policy not to search emails, and the search was not work
related but was for law-enforcement purposes. 220
When the case does not involve an employer-owned or
monitored email system, courts willing to consider user controls will
look at the policy of the private email provider, including the method
of storage of emails and the policy of the service provider concerning
reading or disclosing users' emails. 221 Thus, in Maxwell, while the
court ultimately found that the defendant's expectation of privacy in
his email was lost when the email was received, the court found a
reasonable expectation of privacy against interception of the email. 2 2 2
In doing so, it found persuasive the fact that AOL had a policy "not to
read or disclose subscribers' email to anyone except authorized users,
thus offering its own contractual privacy protection."2 2 3
3. Files Shared Via the Internet
In the context of computer files shared over networks, courts
have looked at the employer's or ISP's policy, as well as the nature of
the software and any protective measures taken by the user. 2 2 4 In
United States v. Heckenkamp, the court found that the defendant had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in computer files despite the fact
that the computer was attached to the network of the university
where he was a student and former employee. 225 "[T]here was no
218. United States v. Long, 64 M.J. 57, 64-65 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
219. Id. at 64.
220. Id. at 64-65.
221. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (finding a limited
reasonable expectation of privacy in emails transmitted on the AOL computer subscription
service, where that system provided a level of privacy to users' emails, stored them on a
centralized and privately owned computer bank, and followed a policy of not reading or disclosing
those emails without a court order); see also Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001)
(finding a disclaimer on a website bulletin board system defeated any claim to privacy).
222. Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 417-18.
223. Id. at 417. This is similar to the subscriber information context. Compare id., with
Freedman v. AOL, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 183 (D. Conn. 2005) (discussing AOL subscriber
agreement, which expressly permitted AOL to reveal account information in certain
circumstances), and United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 509 (W.D. Va. 1999) (
"[T]here is nothing in the record to suggest that there was a restrictive agreement between the
defendant and MindSpring that would limit the right of MindSpring to reveal the defendant's
personal information to nongovernmental entities."), affd, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000).
224. See generally United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *3-6 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010); United
States v. Larson, 66 M.J. 212, 216 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
225. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d at 1146.
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announced monitoring policy on the network," and the university's
policy stated that, "[i]n general, all computer and electronic files
should be free from access by any but the authorized users of those
files."226 The defendant's computer was also password protected and
located in his dormitory room. 227
In contrast, in United States v. Simons, the court found no
reasonable expectation of privacy in files downloaded from the
Internet at the defendant's government workplace, where the public
employer had a stated policy allowing it to audit, inspect, and monitor
employees' Internet use.2 2 8 Likewise, in United States v. Larson, the
court found the defendant to have no reasonable expectation of privacy
in pornographic material or web browser history stored on a
government computer provided to him for official use, where a banner
appeared at each log-on putting him on notice that the computer was
"not to be used for illegal activity" and that it was subject to third-
party monitoring.229
Also relevant is the type of network being used to share files.
In United States v. Ahrndt, the court found that a police officer's
access to an unsecured wireless network, where he was able to
download the defendant's shared iTunes library folder containing
child pornography, was not a search. 230 Analogizing to the expectation
of privacy in cordless phones, the court found a diminished
expectation of privacy in data transferred over unsecured wireless
networks: "As a result of the ease and frequency with which people
use others' wireless networks, I conclude that society recognizes a
lower expectation of privacy in information broadcast via an
unsecured wireless network router than in information transmitted
through a hardwired network or password-protected network."231
Similarly, in United States v. Borowy, the court found that the
FBI's actions in accessing shared files on the peer-to-peer file-sharing
service LimeWire did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights, even though the defendant had attempted (unsuccessfully) to
226. Id. at 1147 (second alteration in original).
227. Id. (concluding the search was justified by the special-needs exception).
228. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000).
229. Larson, 66 M.J. at 215-16; see also United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1248-
49 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding government employee lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in his
personal computer (PC) where he brought the PC to work and connected it to the city network,
but took no measures to password-protect it, limit other employees' access to it, or protect it from
public inspection).
230. United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *9 (D. Or. Jan. 28,
2010).
231. Id. at *5.
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engage a feature that would have prevented others from downloading
or viewing file names.232
Nevertheless, at least one court has found a legitimate privacy
interest in files shared via the Internet, based in part on the presence
of a secure network configuration, albeit in a statutory, rather than
tort or Fourth Amendment, context. 233 In In re Google Street View
Electronic Communications Litigation, the plaintiffs brought a class
action against Google based on its interception of data packets from
plaintiffs' wireless networks using software installed on its Google
Street View vehicles.2 34 Google moved to dismiss the claims for
violation of the Wiretap Act based on its argument that the WiFi
broadcasts were "readily accessible to the general public" under the
Act. 235 The court disagreed, noting that the plaintiffs pled that their
networks were "configured to render the data packets, or electronic
communications, unreadable and inaccessible without the use of rare
packet sniffing software; technology allegedly outside the purview of
the general public."236
The court distinguished Google's facts from those in Ahrndt.237
While both networks were unencrypted, the conduct of the defendant
in Ahrndt "in operating his iTunes software with the preferences set to
share, in conjunction with maintaining an unsecured wireless network
router, diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy to the point
that society would not recognize it as reasonable." 238 In contrast, the
Google plaintiffs pleaded that, "although the networks themselves
were unencrypted, the networks were configured to prevent the
232. United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1048-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
795 (2010); see also United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in files on a computer, where defendant installed
and used LimeWire file-sharing software, "thereby opening his computer to anyone else with the
same freely available program," and where "he was explicitly warned before completing the
installation that the folder into which files are downloaded would be shared with other users in
the peer-to-peer network").
233. In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc'ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1070 (N.D.
Cal. 2011).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1073 (citing statutory definition of "readily accessible to the general public" in
18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (2006)).
236. Id. at 1083; see also id. at 1082-83 ("Unlike in the traditional radio services context,
communications sent via Wi-Fi technology, as pleaded by Plaintiffs, are not designed or intended
to be public. Rather, as alleged, Wi-Fi technology shares a common design with cellular phone
technology, in that they both use radio waves to transmit communications, however they are
both designed to send communications privately, as in solely to select recipients, and both types
of technology are architected in order to make intentional monitoring by third parties difficult."
(citing S. REP. No. 99-541, at 6 (1986))).
237. Id. at 1083-84 (citing United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at
*1, *8 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010)).
238. Id. at 1084 (quoting Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *8).
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general public from gaining access to the data packets without the
assistance of sophisticated technology."23 9  Therefore, the user's
affirmative action in using networks configured to render the data
unreqdable made the privacy expectation a reasonable one. 240
4. Information Posted on a Website
In contrast to the limited protection for email and file-sharing
content, courts have given little privacy protection to postings on an
internet forum or chat room, 24 1 or to other information posted to a
website. 242  As in the email context, these courts have given
significance to language appearing in website policies or banner
announcements indicating that such material is not private. 243 One
court has found a reasonable expectation of privacy to exist in
communications posted to a website, and that finding was based on
the website creator's explicit privacy-ensuring measures. 244
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1083. While the plaintiffs in Google did not allege that their Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated, the court's analysis of the ECPA is still instructive in a
reasonable expectation of privacy context. See generally id. Indeed, the defendant in Ahrndt
argued that his expectation of privacy was per se unreasonable because the search was illegal
under the ECPA. Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *3.
241. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that users of a bulletin
board system lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in messages they posted, where a
disclaimer stated "that personal communications were not private"); United States v. Maxwell,
45 M.J. 406, 418-19 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (denying a privacy expectation to transmissions like chat
room conversations that are "sent to the public at large").
242. See BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, No. 6:06-109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct.
22, 2007) (finding no invasion of privacy where defendant's blog included a link to another
website that posted, with permission, a picture of the plaintiffs); Four Navy Seals v. AP, 413 F.
Supp. 2d 1136, 1145 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (finding no claim for publication of private facts based on
newspaper's publication of photographs a reporter copied from "smugmug," a non-password
protected website where the wife of a Navy Seal, erroneously believing the website was private,
had posted photographs); United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225-26 (D.P.R.
2002) (finding that police officers' use of a photograph downloaded from the Internet to identify a
suspect did not violate the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights, where the website was "under
construction" but not password-protected or located on a secure network and contained no
warnings or other protective measures controlling access to the web page or the photograph),
vacated. 90 F. App'x 3 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Stern v. O'Quinn, 253 F.R.D. 663, 682 (S.D. Fla.
2008) (denying work-product protection for information voluntarily disclosed to the author of a
book and in Internet chat rooms, as there was no evidence the defendants "did not purposefully
and voluntarily" make those disclosures, but the evidence showed that "the types of disclosures
made (i.e., to the author of a book and on the Internet) [were] entirely inconsistent with a desire
to maintain the privacy of the information disclosed" because "books are published and
statements are posted on the Internet precisely for the purpose of making them accessible to
anyone and everyone"); McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 268 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding no
invasion of statutory right to privacy where defendant publicized on his website the plaintiffs
posting on a public message board).
243. See, e.g., Guest, 255 F.3d at 333.
244. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002).
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In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., an airline pilot
"maintained a website where he posted bulletins critical of his
employer."245 The pilot had set up the website to allow only certain
people to register for access to it.246 The airline's vice president
received permission from two of the pilots on the list to create
accounts in their names and thereby gain access. 247  When the
plaintiff pilot learned of these actions, he brought claims against the
airline, including claims based on the Wiretap Act and the SCA.248
First, the court noted that "[t]he legislative history of the ECPA
suggest[ed] that Congress wanted to protect electronic
communications that are configured to private, such as email and
private electronic bulletin boards."2 49 In this instance, the Act also
protected the plaintiffs website since, by its configuration, it was not
readily accessible to the public.250 Second, the court reversed the
district court's finding that the airline was exempt from liability under
the SCA because the vice president had used the name of an
authorized "user" to gain access to the site.251 Instead, that access was
not authorized because the pilots included in the list were not the ones
signing up as the user.252
Affirmative user controls will fail to secure a privacy interest
where the court finds them ineffective. In Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., the
court found no violation of the SCA based on the defendants' accessing
a website that required registration, password creation, and a
statement affirming that the registrant was not associated with
DirecTV. 253 The court reasoned that the ECPA specifies that its
provisions should not be construed to prohibit access to "an electronic
communication system that is configured so that such electronic
245. Id.
246. Id. at 872-73. The language displayed on the home page of the website also warned
that only certain people-not airline management-were allowed to access the site and that
users were required to abide by the site's confidentiality requirement and other terms and
conditions. Id. at 875 n.3.
247. Id. at 873.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 875.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 879-80.
252. Id. at 880.
253. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff in
Snow created his website in response to DirecTV's "nationwide effort to stop the pirating of its
encrypted satellite transmissions" by bringing thousands of anti-piracy actions in court. Id. at
1316. Snow's website-a "private support group" for 'individuals who have been, are being, or
will be sued by any Corporate entity"'-contained language "expressly forbid[ding] access by
DIRECTV [sic] and its agents." Id.
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communication is readily accessible to the general public."25 4 Despite
the fact that the website required a user to register, create a
password, and affirm his non-association with DirecTV, the court
stated, "[n]othing inherent in any of these steps prompts us to infer
that access by the general public was restricted."255  The court
distinguished these facts from those in Konop, and indicated that the
"self-screening methodology" employed by the defendant was
"insufficient to draw an inference that the website is not readily
accessible to the general public."256
In a challenge to a school district's decision to expel a student
based on his creation of a website that was highly derogatory toward
his principal and one of his teachers, the court in J.S. v. Bethelehem
School District reviewed the school district's finding that the student
had no expectation of privacy in the website. 257 Prior to accessing the
website, a visitor "had to agree to a disclaimer" that indicated that the
"visitor was not a member of the [school's] faculty or administration
and . . . did not intend to disclose the identity of the web-site
creator."258 When the school's principal learned of the site from an
anonymous email sent to a faculty member, the principal contacted
the local police and eventually expelled the student.259 The court
found that the school district had not violated the student's right to
privacy when it accessed the website, noting that the site was not
"protected," so "any user who happened upon the correct search terms
could have stumbled upon" it.260 So, while the website creator had
attempted to employ privacy controls, those controls were not
effective; therefore, the website creator could not reasonably expect
privacy. 261
254. Id. at 1320 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g) (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
255. Id. at 1321-22.
256. Id. at 1322.
257. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 415 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), aff'd,
807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). While the case involved a student, which could implicate different legal
issues, the court's analysis made no reference to that fact. Id.
258. Id. (failing to clarify whether that agreement was via clicking or otherwise).
259. Id. at 417.
260. Id. at 425. The court analogized to a person's lack of privacy rights in email once it
is received:
Likewise, the creator of a web-site controls the site until such time as it is posted on
the Internet. Once it is posted, the creator loses control of the web-site's destiny and it
may be accessed by anyone on the Internet. Without protecting the web-site, the
creator takes the risk of other individuals accessing it once it is posted.
Id.
261. Id. The school district's findings of fact during the expulsion hearings included that
"[t]here was no password required to access the Website and although a 'disclaimer' appears, the
custom on the Internet is to ignore disclaimers," and that "[tlhe Website was not 'password
[Vol. 14:3:603640
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Finally, in United States v. D'Andrea, the court found that the
defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
the content of a password-protected website, where an anonymous
person told the police about the website (which contained images of
child abuse and child pornography), and provided the police with the
log-in name and password. 262 The court properly found the case to fall
within the "assumption of the risk" exception whereby "when an
individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk
that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and
if that occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit government
use of that information."263 So while the user employed privacy
controls, those controls were circumvented when a third party gave
police his passwords. 264
5. Online Social Networks
Courts have yet to find any reasonable expectation of privacy
under tort law or the Fourth Amendment for information shared on an
OSN. 265 Most decisions finding a lack of privacy in these contexts are
correct, since the user did not employ any privacy-ensuring
measures.266 But as explained further below, such privacy settings
are on the rise, and courts should give them effect.267
protected' and could be found by 'links'-there was access from other sites." Id. at 416 (citation
omitted).
262. United States v. D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122-23 (D. Mass. 2007), vacated,
648 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011).
263. Id. at 123 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 446 U.S. 109, 117 (1984)). The court
also found the case to be governed by the rule that a person has "no reasonable expectation of
privacy in matters voluntarily disclosed or entrusted to third parties." Id. at 120. This
third-party waiver includes "subscriber information, the length of their stored files, and other
noncontent data to which service providers must have access." Id. The D'Andrea court discussed
at length the scholarship of Professor Warren LaFave, who argues that individual
privacy-enhancing measures such as password-protection should, like "locks, bolts, and burglar
alarms," evidence a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of that website. Id.
at 121 (quoting 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6, at 721 (4th ed. 2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 470-71 (6th Cir.),
vacated, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 23741 (6th Cir. 2007).
264. DAndrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 122-23.
265. See Sandler v. Calcagni, 565 F. Supp. 2d 184, 197 (D. Me. 2008) (holding there was
no claim for invasion of privacy based on publication of plaintiff's revelation found on her
publicly-accessible Myspace.com webpage concerning "her decision to seek psychological help
during college"); Dexter v. Dexter, No. 2006-P-0051, 2007 WL 1532084, at *6 n.4 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 25, 2007) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in writings on MySpace account open
to public view).
266. See, e.g., Dexter, 2007 WL 1532084, at *6 n.4 (affirming that a party could not
exclude from evidence statements about her drug usage made on Myspace).
267. See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (finding that webmail and private messaging "are inherently private such that stored
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Scholars have noted that OSN users expect more privacy in
what they divulge on social networking sites than the law provides,
and consider information to be private "as long as it is not disclosed
outside of the network to which they initially disclosed it."268
Furthermore, OSNs themselves are responding to users' concerns
about privacy by implementing user controls that further that belief.
Recently, Facebook renamed the broad setting allowing disclosure to
any viewer from "Everyone" (which might have suggested "Everyone
on Facebook" as opposed to "Everyone with an Internet Connection")
to "Public," an explicit warning that the setting allows public viewing
beyond Facebook users. 269 Facebook also has enabled its users to
further control the extent their information is accessible to friends and
sub-groups of friends, specifying that certain groups are "Open,"
"Closed," or "Secret."270
Facebook's latest user agreement gives the user a basis for
believing some communications will remain private: "You own all of
the content and information you post on Facebook, and you can control
how it is shared through your privacy and application settings."271 In
addition, Facebook makes a clear distinction between using public and
private settings: "When you publish content or information using the
Public setting, it means that you are allowing everyone, including
people off of Facebook, to access and use that information, and to
associate it with you (i.e., your name and profile picture)."272
Unfortunately, application of the law often outright contradicts such
representations. 2 73
a. OSNs in the Law
One case that has received a lot of attention from privacy
scholars is Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc. 2 74 In that case, a young
woman posted to her "online journal on MySpace.com" an entry titled
"An [O]de to Coalinga," which was a derogatory article about her
messages are not readily accessible to the general public" under the SCA, but remanding for
further evidentiary findings on the issue of whether Facebook wall postings and Myspace
comments are given restricted access under the plaintiffs privacy settings).
268. See Avner Levin & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1002 (2009) (presenting results of an empirical study regarding
personal information protection and expectations of privacy on online social networks).
269. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/




273. See Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656-57 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
274. Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858 (Ct. App. 2009).
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hometown. 275 The woman removed the "ode" from her journal six days
later. 276 In the meantime, however, the principal at the high school in
Coalinga, where the young woman's sister still attended, submitted
the ode to the local paper, which published it in the letters to the
editor section.277 The community response to the letter was extreme:
the young woman's family received death threats, someone fired a
shot at their home, the father had to close his family business, and the
family was forced to move away.278 They then brought suit against
the newspaper for invasion of privacy, specifically public disclosure of
private facts.279
The court noted that "a crucial ingredient of the applicable
invasion of privacy cause of action is a public disclosure of private
facts."2 8 0  Because the young woman published the ode on
MySpace.com, which the court referred to as a "hugely popular
Internet site," the posting was open to the "public eye" and she could
not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to its
contents. 281 While acknowledging that a fact may be private even
when the expectation of privacy is not absolute, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' claim that the ode was not meant to be made "public" and
was taken down after a short time.28 2 The court did not discuss the
issue of privacy settings or other affirmative ways of making
information posted online less "public."283
In contrast, in Romano v. Steelcase Inc., the OSN disclosures at
issue were designated as private under the OSN guidelines, but the
New York Supreme Court still found no privacy interest. 284 The
defendant sought access to the plaintiffs current and historical
Facebook and MySpace pages and accounts, believing such
information to be inconsistent with the plaintiffs claims for injuries
and loss of enjoyment of life. 28 5 The defendant based this argument in
part on what the court referred to as the "public portions" of the





280. Id. at 862.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 863; see also Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 43-45 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2009) (finding the posting of information to a non-password protected or otherwise
restricted website constitutes "publicity" for purposes of invasion of privacy, even though the
information was taken down within two days).
283. Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863.
284. Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656-57 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
285. Id. at 651.
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plaintiffs MySpace and Facebook pages. 286 The plaintiff argued that
such disclosure would violate her right to privacy.287
In considering whether to grant the disclosure, the court noted
the broad scope of discovery under New York law. 2 88 The court also
explained that the plaintiffs should not be permitted to shield
necessary information from discovery when they have put their
physical condition at issue.289  The court noted that both social
networking sites are geared toward the facilitation of sharing of
information, 290 and both sites allow the user to implement privacy
settings to restrict shared information. 291 Agreeing with the
defendant that the information sought was "both material and
necessary to the defense," the court required disclosure:
In light of the fact that the public portions of Plaintiffs social networking sites contain
material that is contrary to her claims and deposition testimony, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the private portions of her sites may contain further evidence such as
information with regard to her activities and enjoyment of life, all of which are material
and relevant to the defense of this action. 2 9 2
In rejecting the plaintiffs argument that disclosure would
violate her right to privacy, the court reasoned that "neither Facebook
nor MySpace guarantee complete privacy," and their user agreements
warn users that profiles are "public spaces."293 Moreover, Facebook's
privacy policy cautions users that "[a]lthough we allow you to set
privacy options that limit access to your pages, . . . no security
measures are perfect or impenetrable" and information posted or
shared with third parties "may become publicly available." 294 The
court thus found no distinction between the public and private
portions of the plaintiffs accounts: "[W]hen Plaintiff created her
Facebook and MySpace accounts, she consented to the fact that her
286. Id. at 654.
287. Id. at 652-53 (indicating that the court had reviewed the parties' submissions "as
well as the applicable federal statutory law, specifically the Stored Communications Act, which
prohibits an entity, such as Facebook and MySpace from disclosing such information without the
consent of the owner of the account," but failing to address the SCA in its opinion (citation
omitted)).
288. Id. at 652.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 653-54.
291. Id. at 654.
292. Id. (emphasis added).
293. Id. at 656. While the discovery context is distinguishable from the context of other
privacy case law, the court here used Fourth Amendment and common law privacy precedents to
determine whether the plaintiff had an expectation of privacy in the material sought in
discovery. Id. at 655-57.
294. Id. at 656-57.
[Vol. 14:3:603644
ONLINE PRIVACY IN OFFLINE PRECEDENTS
personal information would be shared with others, notwithstanding
her privacy settings."295
The court failed to give any weight to the plaintiffs affirmative
action in restricting her disclosures via hei privacy settings.296 To the
court, disclosure on an OSN was equivalent to public disclosure,
regardless of her efforts to limit her audience. 297 This traditional view
of privacy as secrecy fails to recognize any right to control the extent
of that disclosure. While the court may have properly ordered
discovery even if it had recognized a privacy interest in the online
social networking posts, 298 the court's failure to differentiate based on
the plaintiffs affirmative user controls is a failure to view privacy as
the right to control disclosure in addition to the right to prevent
disclosure.
The US District Court for the Central District of California
took a better approach in Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc.2 99 That
case involved a discovery subpoena directed to Facebook, MySpace,
and the web-hosting service Media Temple, Inc.300 The defendant
alleged that the plaintiffs communications on these media were
relevant to his claims for copyright infringement and breach of
contract and were significant to the measure of damages.301 The
plaintiff sought to quash the subpoenas on the basis that they violated
the SCA and his privacy rights.302
The court quashed the subpoena requests for webmail and
private messaging because "those forms of communications media are
inherently private such that stored messages are not readily
accessible to the general public" under the SCA.3 0 3 With respect to the
subpoenas seeking Facebook wall postings and MySpace comments,
however, the court remanded to a magistrate judge for further
evidentiary findings concerning the plaintiffs privacy settings. The
court suggested that if privacy settings restricted access to plaintiffs
postings, then a subpoena would be improper:
295. Id. at 657.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 656-57.
298. Courts have often found that the plaintiff has waived such a privacy right by
bringing a lawsuit and putting her physical condition at issue. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., No. 06-CV-01958-WYD-MJW, 2009 WL 1067018 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009) (ordering
discovery of information from plaintiffs' Facebook, Myspace, and Meetup.Com accounts based in
part on the finding that they waived their doctor-patient privilege concerning their injuries when
they filed the lawsuit to recover based on those injuries).
299. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
300. Id. at 968-69.
301. Id. at 969.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 991.
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Given that the only information in the record implied restricted access, the court
concludes that Judge McDermott's order regarding this aspect of the Facebook and
MySpace subpoenas was contrary to law. Because it appears, however, that a review of
plaintiffs privacy settings would definitively settle the question, the court does not
reverse Judge McDermott's order, but vacates it and remands so that Judge McDermott
can direct the parties to develop a fuller evidentiary record regarding plaintiffs privacy
settings and the extent of access allowed to his Facebook wall and MySpace
comments.
3 0 4
The court thus viewed the privacy to be accorded to the
plaintiffs Facebook and MySpace postings as dependent upon whether
he used privacy controls. 305 While the discovery and SCA contexts are
different from privacy torts, which are in turn different from the
Fourth Amendment context, the courts' analyses in these cases is
instructive in the consideration that the law should give to the use of
privacy settings in various legal contexts.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN
ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS
This Article suggests that courts need to apply more analysis to
questions of privacy online and exceed the bounds of the binary
public/private distinction. Thus, in any case where a person claims a
reasonable expectation of privacy based on a communication or
disclosure online, the court should, in addition to traditional doctrine,
consider four factors.
The first factor is the existence of a user agreement or
employer policy governing the use of the specific communication
mechanism or providing for monitoring of that use. While the user
does not typically control the terms of such an agreement, she decides
to communicate online subject to those terms, and conceivably users
could shop for better privacy terms when choosing ISPs or employers.
Acknowledging such agreements would also have the benefit of
predictability for their users. The Supreme Court noted in dicta in
Quon that the question of whether Quon had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in messages sent from and received on his City-provided
pager was in part governed by the City's Computer Policy, which
provided for no such privacy.306
Second, regardless of any specific policy, the extent to which
third parties are actually given access to the communications or the
communications are protected from disclosure by third parties, such
as employers or ISPs, can give rise to expectations of privacy. This
304. Id. (footnote omitted).
305. See id.
306. City of Ont. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
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may include informal policies of not viewing employees' email or an
ISP's unstated policy of sharing IP addresses with third parties.
Again in Quon, the Court noted that City officers' written and oral
statements and actions might "overr[i]de" the official policy concerning
privacy of the text messages. 307
Third, courts should only give policies or practices credence if
the user has notice of those policies or practices. The importance is
the user's choice to increase or decrease his security through such
controls or lack thereof. Therefore, the notice given to the user of the
user agreement, employer policy, or practice of giving access to or
protection from third parties is critical. If the user is not given notice
of these terms or practices, he should not be bound to them.308
Fourth, the court should consider the availability and
affirmative use of privacy-enhancing controls that increase the
likelihood of the communication being protected from disclosure to
people other than the chosen recipient(s). Such controls include, but
are not limited to, (1) passwords limiting access to email accounts or
wireless networks, (2) encryption technology that inhibits translation
of communications, (3) network configuration that does or does not
allow access to the public, and (4) privacy settings limiting disclosure
to certain people, such as those available to OSN users. The nature of
these controls is limited only by technology, and they will continue to
develop. Courts should consider the controls that are available and in
use, their effectiveness, and the person's decision to employ or not
employ such measures. In the Fourth Amendment context, the
misplaced trust doctrine will still influence the legal effect of using
these controls; so that if a third party gives police a person's password,
then the privacy of that password disappears. But the mere
possibility that a third party could access the password or forward an
email should not defeat privacy protections.
These factors can apply to various contexts in which privacy
issues arise, and they are consistent with the growing weight of
authority with respect to cases involving email and file sharing.309
The biggest change that will result from the application of these
factors is in the case of OSNs, where most courts have yet to give any
effect to user-generated controls. 310 This analysis will result in a
different outcome in email cases like McLaren v. Microsoft, where the
307. Id.at 2629, 2631.
308. See id. at 2630 ("[E]mployer policies concerning communications will of course shape
the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are
clearly communicated.").
309. See supra Parts III.B.2.b-III.B.3.
310. See supra Parts III.A.5-III.B.
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court found no legitimate expectation of privacy in the employee's
email despite his decision to store those emails under a private,
personal password.311 Also, it will change the analysis in a case like
Romano, where the plaintiff restricted the public nature of her OSN
disclosure via her privacy settings. 312
V. CONCLUSION
Because online communications are ubiquitous and increasing
in importance, some privacy is necessary. A number of courts have
correctly found protection for email content, online file sharing over
protected networks, and website postings, where the user enables
privacy-enhancing measures. Courts are correct to reject the
argument that a person lacks a reasonable expectation in email
content simply because it is capable of being recorded and forwarded
to others.
In addition, courts are correct to take into consideration the
stated and unstated policies of employers, websites, and online social
networks with respect to the privacy given to content to which they
have access. They are correct to fault Internet users who claim
privacy despite forgoing any privacy-enhancing measures. But where,
as in Romano, the plaintiff did employ available privacy settings,313
the courts should acknowledge those measures. The affirmative
choice of OSN users to set their privacy settings reflects their
reasonable expectations of the privacy given those communications,
and should not be ignored by the law.
Increasingly more often, OSN users are posting information
with the expectation that the OSN will keep that information private.
When Facebook tells its users that some disclosures are "Closed" or
"Secret," and that the user can control how content and information
she posts is shared "through [her] privacy and application settings,"314
courts should ensure that such promises are more than empty words.
In applying the framework proposed in this Article, courts will give
the same deference to user controls on OSNs that they have begun to
do offline and in other online contexts. The extent of that protection
will depend upon the availability and effectiveness of those controls,
as well as courts' interpretations of societal interests in recognizing
the reasonableness of privacy expectations on the Internet.
311. See McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. App.
May 28, 1999); supra text accompanying notes 202-207.
312. See Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
313. See supra Part III.B.5.
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